Are EU member states doing enough to overcome the current energy crisis?

Short-term interventions can alleviate pressure on energy-intensive industries and low-income households. But long-term resilience depends on whether Europe accelerates vertical diversification to reduce its dependence on imported fossil fuels rather than simply managing their cost.

Rising prices add pressure but do not create the problem

Recent increases in oil and gas prices have intensified pressure on European economies, particularly in countries heavily dependent on fossil imports such as Germany and Italy. Rising transport costs and electricity prices have placed additional strain on industrial competitiveness and household budgets. However, the current shock has not created Europe’s vulnerabilities. It has exposed them.

Many EU economies were already facing structural challenges, including rising system costs, weak industrial growth and continued dependence on imported fossil fuels. The latest price surge has therefore amplified existing weaknesses rather than creating new ones.

Short-term measures are necessary but not sufficient

Governments have responded with tax relief, subsidies and targeted support measures to shield households and industry from immediate cost increases. Such interventions are costly but can be justified. Without them, price shocks could quickly translate into industrial contraction or social pressure. Short-term stabilisation remains an essential part of crisis management.

Yet there is a clear risk: in less resilient energy systems, temporary relief must not become a substitute for structural reform. If short-term measures are used without parallel efforts to reduce fossil dependence, exposure to future shocks remains unchanged.

Relief policies should stabilise the present, not delay transformation

France and Spain show how resilience shapes responses. Differences in national energy systems help explain variations in policy responses. France and Spain, whose power sectors are less dependent on gas, have been less impacted by rising power prices. France benefits from its nuclear fleet, while Spain’s renewable expansion has reduced exposure to gas-driven electricity prices. This structural resilience allows governments to focus relief on specific sectors while broad-scale intervention becomes less costly due to higher resilience.

Nevertheless, fossil price shocks remain unavoidable. Oil price movements affect gasoline and diesel costs across all member states. The key difference lies not in whether shocks occur, but in how strongly they affect domestic systems. Or in other words, successful steps towards greater resilience that have already been taken in the past, now lessen the financial burden for large-scale relief measures that constrain a state’s budget to take further steps towards vertical diversification.

The real lesson: accelerate vertical diversification

No matter how well-designed short-term measures may be, the central lesson of the current crisis lies in the need to accelerate vertical diversification. This shift is already underway. Europe has expanded renewable generation, increased and strengthened grid infrastructure and will continue to do so.

Several member states have renewed interest in nuclear energy as part of a diversified low-carbon mix. At the same time, investments in domestic supply chains, including lithium mining and battery production, aim to reduce vulnerabilities in emerging clean technology sectors.

These developments predate the current crisis but have gained renewed attention as fossil price volatility has returned to the political agenda. Reducing fossil dependence is no longer only a climate objective. It has become a resilience strategy.

Conflicting signals risk slowing progress

Despite ongoing progress, policy signals across Europe remain mixed. Germany’s renewed focus on gas infrastructure highlights the tension between short-term security and long-term decarbonisation. In Italy, criticism of the EU Emissions Trading System raises concerns about investment certainty and the pace of structural transformation. Such developments illustrate how policy direction, not only policy design, influences long-term resilience. Short-term affordability concerns are legitimate, but inconsistent signals risk slowing investments that are essential for reducing exposure to future shocks.

Conclusion: Stabilise today, build resilience tomorrow

EU member states have taken steps to manage the immediate effects of rising energy prices. Short-term relief remains essential to protect vulnerable households and energy-intensive industries from sudden shocks, but managing the current crisis is not the same as overcoming it. 

It is not a question of choosing between short-term relief and long-term transformation. Both are necessary, particularly in times of fiscal constraints and increasing geopolitical volatility. Public budgets are limited, and future crises (whether geopolitical or market-driven) are likely to occur again. In such an environment, short-term measures should be designed to support those most in need without creating the impression that the underlying risks have disappeared.

Relief policies should therefore be as targeted as possible. Broad and repeated interventions risk fostering a sentiment that the system is fundamentally stable, even when structural vulnerabilities remain. In reality, the persistence of fossil dependence means that similar price shocks will almost certainly return sooner or later.

What matters most is whether Europe uses the current crisis to accelerate vertical diversification. Expanding renewable generation, strengthening electrification and building domestic supply chains are not simply climate policies, they are investments in long-term resilience and meaningful independence from volatile fossil markets.

Progress so far has already made Europe more resilient than it was in previous crises. Continuing along this path is therefore not optional. It has become strategic. Short-term measures can stabilise the present. But long-term resilience will determine whether Europe enters the next crisis better prepared, or just as exposed as it is today.